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Abstract—The cipher block chaining (CBC) block cipher 
mode of operation presents a very popular way of encrypting 
which is used in various applications. In previous research work, 
we have mathematically proven that, under some conditions, this 
mode of operation can admit a chaotic behavior according to 
Devaney. Proving that CBC mode is chaotic is only the beginning 
of the study of its security. The next step, which is the purpose of 
this paper, is to develop the quantitative study of the chaotic 
CBC mode of operation by evaluating the level of sensibility and 
expansivity for this mode. 
Keywords—Cipher Block Chaining; mode of operation; Block 
cipher; Devaney’s chaos; sensivity; expansivity. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Block ciphers have a very simple principle. They do not 
treat the original text bit by bit but they manipulate blocks of 
text for example, a block of 64 bits for the DES (Data 
Encryption Standard) or a block of 128 bits for the AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm. In fact, the 
original text is broken into blocks of N bits. For each block, the 
encryption algorithm is applied to obtain an encrypted block 
which has the same size. Then we gather all blocks, which are 
encrypted separately, to obtain the complete encrypted 
message. For decryption, we precede in the same way but this 
time starting from the cipher text to obtain the original message 
using the decryption algorithm instead of the encryption 
function. So, it is not sufficient to put anyhow a block cipher 
algorithm in a program. We can instead use these algorithms in 
various ways according to their specific needs. These ways are 
called the block cipher modes of operation. There are several 
modes of operation and each mode has owns characteristics 
and its specific security properties. In this article, we will 
consider only one of these modes, which is the cipher block 
chaining (CBC) mode. 
The chaos theory we consider in this paper is the Devaney’s 
topological one [1]. In addition to being recognized as one of 
the best mathematical definition of chaos, this theory offers a 
framework with qualitative and quantitative tools to evaluate 
the notion of unpredictability [2]. As an application of our 
fundamental results, we are interested in the area of 
information safety and security. 
In this paper, which is an extension of our previous article 
[3], the theoretical study of the chaotic behavior for the CBC 
mode of operation is deepened by evaluating its level of 
sensibility and expansivity [4]. Our fundamental study is 
motivated by the desire to produce chaotic programs in the area 
of information security. 
The remainder of this research work is organized as 
follows. In Section 2, we will recall some basic definitions 
concerning chaos and cipher-block chaining mode of operation. 
Section 3 is devoted to the results of our previous research 
works. In Section 4 quantitative topological properties for 
chaotic CBC mode of operation is studied in detail. This 
research work ends by a conclusion section in which our 
contribution is recalled and some intended future work are 
proposed. 
II. BASIC RECALLS 
This section is devoted to basic definitions and terminologies 
in the field of topological chaos and in the one of block cipher 
mode of operation. 
A. Devaney’s chaotic dynamical systems 
In the remainder of this article, S𝑛 denotes the n𝑡ℎ term of a 
sequence S while χℕ is the set of all sequences whose elements 
belong to χ. 𝑉𝑖 stands for the i
𝑡ℎ component of a vector V. 
ƒ𝑘 = ƒ ° … °ƒ is for the 𝑘𝑡ℎ composition of a function ƒ. ℕ is 
the set of natural (non-negative) numbers, while ℕ* stands for 
the positive integers 1, 2, 3, . . . Finally, the following notation 
is used: ⟦1; 𝑁⟧ = {1,2,… , 𝑁}.  
Consider a topological space (𝜒, 𝜏) and a continuous 
function ƒ: 𝜒 → 𝜒 on (𝜒, 𝜏). 
 Definition 1.  The function ƒ is topologically transitive 
if, for any pair of open sets 𝑈, 𝑉 ⊂ 𝜒  U, there exists an 
integer 𝑘 > 0 such that ƒ𝑘 (U) ∩ V ≠ ∅. 
 Definition 2.  An element 𝑥 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 for ƒ of 
period 𝑛 ∈ ℕ, n > 1, 𝑖𝑓 ƒn(𝑥) = 𝑥  and ƒk(𝑥) ≠ 𝑥 . ƒ is 
regular on (𝜒, 𝜏) if the set of periodic points for ƒ is 
dense in 𝜒 : for any point 𝑥 in 𝜒 , any neighborhood of 
𝑥 contains at least one periodic point. 
 Definition 3.  (Devaney’s formulation of chaos [1]) The 
function ƒ is chaotic on (𝜒, 𝜏) if ƒ is regular and 
topologically transitive. The chaos property is strongly 
linked to the notion of “sensitivity”, defined on a metric 
space (𝜒, 𝜏) by: 
 Definition 4. The function ƒ has sensitive dependence 
on initial conditions if there exists 𝛿 > 0 such that, for 
any 𝑥 ∈ 𝜒 and any neighborhood 𝑉 of 𝑥, there exist 
𝑦 ∈ 𝑉 and 𝑛 > 0 such that 𝑑(𝑓𝑛(𝑥), 𝑓𝑛(𝑦))  > 𝛿. δ is 
called the constant of sensitivity of ƒ. 
  Indeed, Banks et al. have proven in [5] that when ƒ is 
chaotic and (𝜒, 𝜏) is a metric space, then ƒ has the property 
of sensitive dependence on initial conditions (this property 
was formerly an element of the Devaney’s definition of 
chaos). Additionally, the transitivity property is often 
obtained as a consequence of the strong transitivity one, 
which is defined below [6]. 
 Definition 5. ƒ 𝑖s strongly transitive  on (𝜒, 𝑑)  if, for 
all point 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝜒 and for all neighborhood √ of 𝑥, it 
exists 𝑛 ∈ ℕ and 𝑥′ ∈ √ such that 𝑓𝑛(𝑥′) = 𝑦. 
Finally, a function f has a constant of expansivity equal to 𝜀 
if an arbitrarily small error on any initial condition is 
always magnified until 𝜀 [6]. Mathematically speaking,  
Definition 6.  The function f is said to have the property of     
expansitivity  if ∃ε > 0, ∀ x ≠ y, ∃ nϵℕ, 𝑑(𝑓𝑛(𝑥), 𝑓𝑛(𝑦)) ≥ 𝜀.  
Then, 𝜀 is the constant of expansivity of ƒ. We also say that 
ƒ is 𝜀 -expansive. 
B. CBC properties   
Like some other modes of operation, the CBC mode requires 
not only a plaintext but also an initialization vector (IV) as 
input. In what follows, we will show how this mode of 
operation works in practice 
1) Initialisation vector IV   
As what have been already announced, in addition to the 
plaintext the CBC mode of operation requires an initialization 
vector in order to randomize the encryption. This vector is 
used to produce distinct cipher texts even if the same plaintext 
is encrypted multiple times, without the need of a slower re-
keying process [7].  
An initialization vector must be generated for each 
execution of the encryption operation, and the same vector is 
necessary for the corresponding execution of the decryption 
operation, see Figure 1. Therefore the IV, or information that is 
sufficient to calculate it, must be available to each party of any 
communication. The initialization vector does not need to be 
secret, so the IV, or information sufficient to determine the IV, 
may be transmitted with the cipher text. In addition, the 
initialization vector must be unpredictable: for any given 
plaintext, it must not be possible to predict the IV that will be 
associated to the plaintext, in advance to the vector generation 
[8]. 
There are two recommended methods for generating 
unpredictable IVs. The first method is to apply the forward 
cipher function, under the same key that is used for the 
encryption of the plaintext, to a nonce. The nonce must be a 
data block that is unique to each execution of the encryption 
operation. 
For example, the nonce may be a counter or a message 
number. The second method is to generate a random data block 
using a FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard)-
approved random number generator [8, 9]. 
2) Padding process 
 
A block cipher works on units of a fixed size (known as a 
block size), but messages come in variety of lengths. So some 
modes, namely the ECB (Electronic Codebook) and CBC ones, 
require that the final block is padded before encryption. In 
other words, the total number of bits in the plaintext must be a 
positive multiple of the block size N. 
 If the data string to be encrypted does not initially satisfy 
this property, then the formatting of the plaintext must entail an 
increase in the number of bits. A common way to achieve the 
necessary increase is to append some extra bits, called padding, 
to the trailing end of the data string as the last step in the 
formatting of the plaintext. An example of a padding method is 
to append a single 1 bit to the data string and then to pad the 
resulting string by as few 0 bits, possibly none, as are necessary 
to complete the final block (other methods may be used). 
For the above padding method, the padding bits can be 
removed unambiguously provided the receiver can determine 
that the message is indeed padded. One way to ensure that the 
receiver does not mistakenly remove bits from an unpadded 
message is to require the sender to pad every message, 
including messages in which the final block is already 
complete. For such messages, an entire block of padding is 
appended. Alternatively, such messages can be sent without 
padding if, for each message, the existence of padding can be 
reliably inferred, e.g., from a message length indicator [8]. 
 
3) CBC mode characteristics 
 
Cipher block chaining is a block cipher mode that provides 
confidentiality but not message integrity in cryptography. The 
CBC mode offers a solution to the greatest part of the 
problems presented by the ECB (Electronic codebook) for 
example [10], because thanks to CBC mode the encryption 
will depends on the context. Indeed, the cipher text of each 
encrypted block will depend not only on the initialization 
vector IV but also on the plaintext of all preceding blocks. 
Specifically, the binary operator XOR is applied between the 
current bloc of the plaintext and the previous block of the 
cipher text, as depicted in Figure 1. Then, we apply the 
encryption function to the result of this operation. For the first 
block, the initialization vector takes place of the previous 
cipher text block.  
The main objective of this series of articles regarding the 
chaotic topological behavior of the CBC mode of operation is 
to understand in which extent this mode depends on its inputs. 
More precisely, is it possible to understand this dependence, in 
such a way that the effects of a modification of the IV and/or 
the message can be predicted? If so, this kind of weakness 
could be considered in the design of specific attacks, while if 
the converse is proven, that is to say, if the mid-to-long term 
effects of a slight modification of the input cannot be 
predicted, that chaotic dependence will make such attacks 
inefficient. 
 
                                                 
   
Fig. 1. CBC mode of operation 
 CBC mode has several advantages. In fact, this mode 
encrypts the same plaintext differently with different 
initialization vectors. In addition, the encryption of each block 
depends on the preceding block and therefore, if the order of 
the cipher text blocks is modified, the decryption will be 
impossible and the recipient realizes the problem. 
Furthermore, if a transmission error affects the encrypted 
block Ci, then only the blocks mi and mi+1 are assigned, the 
other blocks will be determined correctly.  
 CBC has been the most commonly used mode of 
operation. Its main drawbacks are that encryption is sequential 
(i.e., it cannot be parallelized), and that the message must be 
padded to a multiple of the cipher block size. One way to 
handle this last issue is through the method known as cipher 
text stealing. Note that a one-bit change in a plaintext or IV 
affects all following cipher text blocks.  
 Decrypting with the incorrect initialization vector 
causes the first block of plaintext to be corrupted, but 
subsequent plaintext blocks will be correct. This is because a 
plaintext block can be recovered from two adjacent blocks of 
cipher text. As a consequence, decryption can be parallelized. 
Note that a one-bit change on the cipher text causes complete 
corruption of the corresponding block of plaintext, and inverts 
the corresponding bit in the following block of plaintext, but 
the rest of the blocks remain intact. 
  In what follows, we will summarize the results which 
proof the chaotic behavior of the CBC mode of operation. 
III. PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED RESULTS 
In this section we will interest to our previous results which 
have been detailed in [3], in which we have been proven that 
some well chosen block ciphers can lead to a chaotically 
behavior for the CBC mode of operation. Indeed, this mode 
can be seen as a discrete dynamical system (recurrent 
sequence), whose evolution can thus be studied using common 
tools taken from the mathematical analysis [11]. 
A. Modeling the CBC mode as a dynamical system  
Our modeling follows a same canvas than what has be done 
for hash functions [12, 6] or pseudorandom number generation 
[11].  
Let us consider the CBC mode of operation with a keyed 
encryption function 𝐸𝑘: 𝐵
𝑁 → 𝐵𝑁 depending on a secret key 
k, N is the size for the block cipher, and 𝐷𝑘: 𝐵
𝑁 → 𝐵𝑁 is the 
associated decryption function, which is such that ∀𝑘, 𝐸𝑘°𝐷𝑘  
is the identity function. We define the Cartesian product X = 
𝐵𝑁 ×  𝑆𝑁, where: 
 B = {0, 1} is the set of Boolean values, 
 𝑆𝑁 = ⟦2
𝑁−1⟧ 𝑁the set of infinite sequences of natural 
integers bounded by 2𝑁 − 1, or the set of infinite N-
bits block messages, in such a way that χ is 
constituted by couples of internal states of the mode 
of operation together with sequences of block 
messages. Let us consider the initial function:  
   i:  𝑆𝑁  →⟦2
𝑁−1⟧ 𝑁  
    (𝑚𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 → 𝑚
0  
That the returns the first block of a (infinite) message, and the 
shift function: 
 𝑆𝑁                      →         𝑆𝑁
 
   
(𝑚0, 𝑚1, 𝑚2,…) → (𝑚
1, 𝑚2, 𝑚3,…) 
which removes the first block of a message. Let 𝑚𝑗  be the 𝑗-th 
integer, or block message, 𝑚 ∈ ⟦0, 2𝑁−1⟧ 𝑁  , expressed in the 
binary numeral system, and when counting from the left. We 
define:
 
𝐹ƒ: 𝐵
𝑁 ×   ⟦0, 2𝑁−1⟧ 𝑁 → 𝐵𝑁  
(𝑥, 𝑚)→ (𝑥𝑗𝑚𝑗 + 𝑓(𝑥)𝑗𝑚𝑗)𝑗=1..𝑁  
This function returns the inputted binary vector x, whose 
𝑚𝑗-th components 𝑥𝑚𝑗  have been replaced by  ƒ(𝑥)𝑚𝑗  , for 
all 𝑗 = 1. . 𝑁 such that 𝑚𝑗 = 0. In case where ƒ is the vectorial 
negation, this function will correspond to one XOR between 
the clair text and the previous encrypted state. So the CBC 
mode of operation can be rewritten as the following dynamical 
system: 
                 𝑋0 = (𝐼𝑉, 𝑚) 
 
 
                     𝑋𝑛+1 = (𝐸𝑘° Fƒ0  (i(X1
N, X2
N), σ(X1
N))) 
 For any given g: ⟦0, 2𝑁−1⟧ 𝑁  × 𝐵𝑁 →𝐵𝑁, we denote 𝐺𝑔 (𝑋)= 
(𝑔(𝑖(𝑋1), 𝑋2); 𝜎(𝑋1)) (when 𝑔 = 𝐸𝑘° Fƒ0  , we obtain one 
cipher block of the CBC, as depicted in Figure 1). So the 
recurrent relation of Eq.(1) can be rewritten in a condensed 
way, as follows: 
𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝐺𝐸𝑘° Fƒ0
(𝑋𝑛) 
With such a rewriting, one iterate of the discrete dynamical 
system above corresponds exactly to one cipher block in the 
CBC mode of operation. Note that the second component of 
this system is a subshift of finite type, which is related to the 
symbolic dynamical systems known for their relation with 
chaos [13]. 
We now define a distance on χ as follows: 
 𝑑((𝑥;  𝑚); (?̌?;  ?̌?)) = 𝑑𝑒  (𝑥, ?̌?) + 𝑑𝑚  (𝑚, ?̌?), where: 
 
                  𝑑𝑒  (𝑥, ?̌?)=∑ 𝛿(𝑥𝑘 , ?̌?𝑘)
𝑁
𝑘=1  
 
 
 
                 𝑑𝑚 (𝑚, ?̌?)= 
9
𝑁
 ∑
∑ |mi− m̌i|
N
i=1
10k
∞
𝑘=1  
 
This distance has been introduced to satisfy the following 
requirements: 
 The integral part between two points 𝑋, 𝑌 of the 
phase space  χ  corresponds to the number of binary 
components that are different between the two 
internal states 𝑋1 and 𝑌1.  
 The 𝑘-th digit in the decimal part of the distance 
between 𝑋 and 𝑌 is equal to 0 if and only if the 
𝑘-th blocks of messages 𝑋2and 𝑌2are equal. This 
desire is at the origin of the normalization factor  
9
𝑁
. 
B. Proofs of chaos 
As mentioned in Definition 3, a function ƒ is chaotic on (χ; 𝜏) 
if ƒ is regular and topologically transitive. 
 We have began by stating some propositions that are 
primarily required in order to proof the chaotic behavior of the 
CBC mode of operation. 
First of all, using the sequential characterization of the 
continuity, we have established that 𝐺𝑔  is a continuous map on 
(𝜒, 𝑑). After having recalled that a directed graph is strongly 
connected when it contains a directed path from u to v, for 
every pair of vertices u, v, we have established the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1: Let 𝑔 =𝐸𝑘° Fƒ0, where is a given keyed block 
cipher and ƒ0: 𝐵
𝑁 → 𝐵𝑁, (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑁 ) → (𝑥1̅̅̅, … , 𝑥𝑁̅̅̅̅  ) is the 
Boolean vectorial negation. We consider the directed graph 
𝐺𝑔, where: 
 Vertices are all the N-bits words. 
 There is an edge 𝑚 ∈ ⟦0, 2𝑁−1⟧ from 𝑥 to ?̌? if and 
only if 𝑔(𝑚, 𝑥) = ?̌?. 
So if 𝐺𝑔 is strongly connected, then 𝐺𝑔 is strongly 
transitive. 
Proving by doing so the strong transitivity of 𝐺𝑔  on(𝜒, 𝑑). 
We have then proven that, 
Proposition 2: If 𝐺𝑔 is strongly connected, then 𝐺𝑔  
𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟. 
According to Propositions 1 and 2, we can conclude that, 
if the directed graph 𝐺𝑔 is strongly connected, then the CBC 
mode of operation is chaotic according to Devaney, as 
established in our previous research work. In that article and 
for illustration purpose, we have also given some examples of 
encryption functions making this mode a chaotic one. 
We have previously recalled that the mathematical 
framework of the theory of chaos offers tools to measure this 
unpredictable behavior quantitatively. The firsts of these 
measures are the constants of sensitivity and of expansivity, 
recalled in the definitions section. We now intend to 
investigate these measures. 
IV. QUANTITATIVE MEASURES 
Let us firstly focus on the sensitivity property of the CBC 
mode of operation. 
A. Sensitivity 
Property 1:  The CBC mode of operation is sensible to the 
initial condition, and its constant of sensibility is larger than 
the length N of the block size.  
Proof:  Let 𝑋 = (𝑥; (𝑚0, 𝑚1, . . . )) ∈ 𝑋 and δ > 0. We are 
looking for 𝑋′ = (𝑥′; (𝑚′0, 𝑚′1, . . . ))  and n ∈ N such that  
𝑑(𝑋, 𝑋′) < δ and 𝑑 (𝐺𝑔
𝑛(𝑋), 𝐺𝑔
𝑛(𝑋′)) > N.  
Let us define 𝑘0= ⌊−𝑙𝑜𝑔10(𝛿)⌋ + 1, in such a way that all 𝑋
′ 
of the form: 
(𝑋1, (𝑚
0 , 𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑘0 , 𝑚′𝑘0+1 , 𝑚′𝑘0+2 , … )) 
are such that 𝑑(𝑋, 𝑋′) < δ. In other words, all messages 𝑚′  
whose 𝑘0 first blocks are equal to (𝑚
0 , 𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑘0) are δ-
close to 𝑋. 
 
Fig. 2. 𝑘0+1 th iterate of 𝐺𝑔 
Let 𝑦 = 𝐺𝑔
𝑘0(𝑋) 1 and 𝑧 = 𝐺𝑔
𝑘0+1(𝑋) 1 as defined in Figure 2. 
We consider the block message 𝑚′ defined by: 
 𝑚′ = 𝑦 ⊕  Dk(𝑧̅) where Dk is the keyed decryption function 
associated to Ek, and 𝑧 ̅is the negation of 𝑧 . We thus define 
𝑋′as follow:  
 𝑋1
′  = 𝑥 
 ∀ 𝑘 ≤  𝑘0, 𝑚
′𝑘 =  𝑚𝑘 
 𝑚′𝑘0+1 =  𝑚′ 
 ∀ 𝑘 ≥ 𝑘0 + 2, 𝑚
′𝑘 =  ?̅?𝑘   
So 𝑑 (𝐺𝑔
𝑘0+1(𝑋), 𝐺𝑔
𝑘0+1(𝑋′)) 
= 𝑑 (𝐺𝑔 (𝑦; (𝑚𝑘0+1, 𝑚𝑘0+2, … )), 𝐺𝑔 (𝑦; (𝑚
′, 𝑚𝑘0+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑘0+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … ))) 
 = 𝑑 ((𝑧; (𝑚𝑘0+2, 𝑚𝑘0+3, … )), (𝐸𝑘(𝑦 ⊕ m′); (𝑚𝑘0+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑘0+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … ))) 
= 𝑑 ((𝑧; (𝑚𝑘0+2, 𝑚𝑘0+3, … )), (𝐸𝑘 ( 𝑦
⊕ (y ⊕ Dk(𝑧̅))) ; (𝑚𝑘0+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑘0+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … ))) 
 
  
= 𝑑 ((𝑧; (𝑚𝑘0+2, 𝑚𝑘0+3, … )), (𝐸𝑘((y ⊕ y) ⊕ Dk(𝑧̅)); (𝑚𝑘0+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑘0+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … ))) 
 
 = 𝑑 ((𝑧; (𝑚𝑘0+2, 𝑚𝑘0+3, … )), (𝐸𝑘(0 ⊕   Dk(𝑧̅)); (𝑚𝑘0+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑘0+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … ))) 
= 𝑑 ((𝑧; (𝑚𝑘0+2, 𝑚𝑘0+3, … )), (𝐸𝑘(Dk(𝑧̅)); (𝑚𝑘0+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑘0+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … ))) 
= 𝑑 ((𝑧; (𝑚𝑘0+2, 𝑚𝑘0+3, … )), (𝑧̅; (𝑚𝑘0+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑘0+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … ))) 
= 𝑑𝑒 (𝑧, ?̌?)  + 𝑑𝑚 ((𝑚𝑘0+2, 𝑚𝑘0+3, … ), (𝑚𝑘0+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑘0+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … )) 
= 𝑁 +
9
𝑁
 ∑ (
𝑚𝑘−𝑚𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
10𝑘
)∞𝑘=𝑘0+2  
= 𝑁 +
9
𝑁
 ∑ (
𝑁
10𝑘
)∞𝑘=𝑘0+2  
= 𝑁 +
9
𝑁
 ∑ (
1
10𝑘
)∞𝑘=𝑘0+2 = 𝑁 +
1
10𝑘0+1
 > 𝑁, 
 
which concludes the proof of the sensibility of 𝐺𝑔.  
The second important tool which reinforces the chaotic 
behavior of the CBC mode of operation is the expansivity. The 
study of this property, which has been recalled in definition 6, 
will be regarded below. 
B. Expansivity 
In this section we offer the proof that: 
Proposition 3: The CBC mode of operation is not expansive. 
Proof: consider for instance two initial vectors 𝑥 =
 (1,0, … ,0) and 𝑥′ =  (0,1,0, … ,0), associated to the messages 
𝑚 =  ((0,1,0, … ,0), (0, . . ,0), (0, … ,0), … ) and 𝑚′ =
((1,0, … ,0), (0, . . ,0), (0, … ,0), … ):all blocks of messages are 
nul in both 𝑚 and 𝑚′, expect the first block. Let 𝑋 = (𝑥, 𝑚) 
and 𝑋′ = (𝑥′, 𝑚′). 
Obviously, 𝑥 ≠ 𝑥′, while 𝑥 ⊕ m0 =  𝑥′ ⊕ m′0. 
This latter implies that 𝑋1
0 = 𝑋1
′0, and by a recursive process, 
we can conclude that ∀𝑖𝜖 𝑁, 𝑋1
𝑖 = 𝑋1
′𝑖. So the distance between 
points 𝑋 = (𝑥, 𝑚) and 𝑋′ = (𝑥′, 𝑚′) is strictly positive, while 
for all 𝑛 > 0 d (𝐺𝑔
𝑛(𝑋), 𝐺𝑔
𝑛(𝑋′) = 0), which concludes the 
proof of the non expansive character of the CBC mode of 
operation by the mean of the exhibition of a counter example. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
In this paper, both expansivity and sensibility of symmetric 
ciphers are regarded, in the case of the CBC mode of 
operation. These quantitative topology metrics taken from the 
mathematical theory of chaos allow to measure in which 
extent a slight error in the initial condition is magnified during 
iterations. It is stated that, in addition to being chaotic as 
defined in the Devaney’s formulation, the CBC mode of 
operation is indeed largely sensible to initial errors or 
modifications on either the IV or the message to encrypt. Its 
expansivity has been regarded too, but this property is not 
satisfied, as it has been established thanks to a counter 
example. 
In future work, we intend to deepen the topological 
study of the behavior of the CBC mode of operation. We will 
study whether this mode of operation possesses other 
qualitative properties of disorder like the topological mixing. 
Additionally, other quantitative evaluations will be performed, 
and the level of topological entropy will be evaluated too. 
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